Drawing upon ideas formulated with national level campaigning in mind and also analyses of district or local-level campaigning, a conceptual framework to assist in analysing the development of district-level campaigning is presented. The proposed framework is further amplified, explained and tested using quantitative and qualitative data collected at British general elections between 1992 and 2005. Various aspects of district (constituency) campaigning in Britain are examined and the extent of change over four general elections analysed. In broad terms, the data show a good fit with the framework which offers a useful way of thinking about developments in campaigning both within and across countries.
Introduction
For most political parties election campaigning is a core activity. Apart from a few on the fringes of politics, all parties contest elections and seek to win support among the electorate.
For as long as there have been competitive elections, indeed, there has been election campaigning. Parties devote enormous resources to the activity, national campaigns attract intense media interest and many thousands of party activists (still) get involved at local level.
Not surprisingly, this key area of party activity has attracted considerable attention from scholars. For the most part they have focused on national-level campaigning but in recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in 'on-the-ground' campaigning at the level of the electoral district -both in Britain and elsewhere. This literature has thrown light on a number of important questions including how campaigning has changed, in style and in activities undertaken, in response to changes among the electorate and to technological developments. In addition, studies have explored differences between parties in the extent to which they are able to harness their campaign resources effectively. Such differences often reflect cultural and institutional features of parties. The respective roles assigned to the central bureaucracy and grass-roots activists in the management of campaigns is an aspect of campaign organisation that has implications for perennial questions relating to the distribution of power within parties. Academic interest in election campaigning has been sustained by the emergence of a burgeoning literature on political communications and political marketing in which a particular area of interest has been the extent to which parties are increasingly using campaign techniques derived from the commercial world.
Attempts have been made to provide a comparative framework for understanding the development of campaigning at national level but there has been little comparable work on district-level campaigning, despite the emerging evidence that in a number of countries such campaigning can significantly affect election outcomes. This article represents an attempt to address this lacuna. In the first section we discuss two models of change in national campaigning before going on to draw some lessons from comparative studies of local campaigning.
The Development of National Campaigning
In her comparative analysis of campaigning, Pippa Norris (2002) suggests that campaigns have developed through three phases: Pre-modern (characterising the period from the midnineteenth century to the 1950s), Modern (from the early 1960s to the late 1980s), and Postmodern (from the 1990s onwards). Pre-modern campaigning was pre-eminently local and focused on direct contact between candidates and citizens. Campaigns were locally organised, locally staffed and based on traditional labour-intensive methods. Such national campaigning as existed was co-ordinated by party leaders and was characterised by shortterm, ad hoc planning. Modern campaigns involved greater co-ordination by central party officials. The national campaign was clearly paramount (reflecting the growth of television) and party campaign activity became more professionalised. Finally, the Post-Modern campaign involves continuous campaigning -it is no longer confined to the few months before an election -and much use of professional consultants. Media management is a key (perhaps the key) activity at national level and although more emphasis is given to local campaigning (involving new techniques) local activity becomes more tightly managed and co-ordinated by the centre.
A categorisation of this kind is inevitably somewhat simplified. It seems far-fetched, for example, to claim that nineteenth century campaigns belong in the same ('pre-modern') category as those in the 1950s. Arguably, national campaigning began to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century, developed between the wars and was already well-established by specialization and niche marketing. Thus, campaigns and campaign techniques are adjusted to meet voter demands, and this requires more flexible and more skilled campaign managers.
Denver and Hands note that the application of the Fordist/Post-Fordist distinction to district campaigning is exploratory only and concede that it meets with mixed success. While many of the new campaign techniques have Post-Fordist connotations, the same cannot be said of developments in the organisation and management of campaigns. A fuller categorisation is required, therefore, that captures more of the dimensions of campaign change.
The need for an alternative framework is further highlighted by comparative work, which suggests that developments in district-level campaigning vary across different countries. In Canada, for example, Carty et al. (2003) posit a two-stage process that explains how campaigns vary in terms of style, funding and local autonomy. The competitiveness of the electoral district, the nature of the nomination process and the structure of the party combine to produce four main candidate types. Each of these types in turn is associated with a distinctive pattern of campaign organisation and practice. Variations in the extent of local autonomy indicate that campaigns have evolved from being purely local affairs and now involve the central or regional party to a greater or lesser degree.
In New Zealand, Denemark (2003) argues that moves towards Norris' Modern phase were delayed. Indeed, it was not until the late 1970s that television began to play a key role in campaigns. Until the late 1980s local campaigns were 'low profile, non-professional, nationally focussed, and susceptible to local MP demands for attention, irrespective of the seat's overall strategic importance ' (p. 603) . In reaction to poor election results, however, the major parties began to rethink campaigning and the change to the electoral system in 1996 accelerated the process of change. As a consequence, district campaigning was modernised in much the same way as in other countries. Ward's (2003) study of campaigning in Australia suggests a similar pattern of change. From the 1980s, there was a big shift in Australian district campaigning with an increasing emphasis on tactical seats and key voters within them. In Ireland, however, the Norris model fits poorly. According to Marsh (2004) local campaigning in Ireland remains very much a matter of personal contact between candidates and voters -'meeting the folks ' (p. 263) . Irish district campaigns are essentially pre-modern. In the 2002 Irish elections, for example, some 55% of voters recalled being visited by at least one candidate -in both absolute and comparative terms, a very high figure (pp. 249-50) . In addition, everyone involved -candidates, party professionals, commentators -believes that personalised campaigning is effective (and this is supported by statistical analysis) so that that Irish campaigning is likely to remain pre-modern for the foreseeable future.
A Framework for Analysing Change in District Campaigning
Overall, then, previous work on district campaigning suggests that it would be useful to develop a framework that moves beyond simplified notions of 'traditional' and 'modern' styles of campaigning and identifies different stages of development as well as core themes.
In particular, it would allow us to evaluate the extent to which parties' campaign styles develop and enable us to compare campaigning by different parties, as well as campaigns in different countries. We seek to introduce such a framework here and then test it using available data from detailed studies of campaigns at the last four general elections in Britain (1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005) .
The intention is that the framework can be used for comparative purposes. It is apparent, however, that differing institutional contexts such as the electoral system, campaign regulations, the party system and so on will have a significant impact on some of its aspects (see Norris, 2002) . For example, the targeting of marginal constituencies is likely to be a much more significant activity in plurality and majoritarian electoral systems than in (at least some) PR systems. The structure of the party system will also be important: in multi-party systems there are likely to be greater variations in campaigning than in two-or three-party systems. Finally, variations in electoral regulation will have a mediating impact on campaigning. Where campaign expenditure limits exist, for example, those set at a lower level are likely to promote more labour-intensive volunteer-led forms of campaigning. An example of institutional mediation leading to campaign variation can be found in Farrell and Scully's study of MEPs (2007) . They show that voter canvassing using either personal contact or by telephone, is more prevalent in candidate-focussed systems like STV and in Britain, where despite the introduction of List PR for European Elections, a culture of more traditional campaigning evidently endures (Farrell & Scully, 2007: 130-7 ).
Norris's 'dominant era' model is not entirely suitable as a framework -it is mainly concerned with national campaigning and does not fit particularly well in some countries. Our typology is derived, therefore, from Farrell and Webb's model of campaign professionalism which allows for more nuanced and accurate indicators of campaign change but is adapted here to refer specifically to district-level campaigning. The framework is summarised in Figure 1 .
We propose a three-stage model, each stage being differentiated by Technical, Resource and Thematic developments. Technical matters refer principally to two things. First, the extent to which district campaigns involve long-term preparation both in the district and at party headquarters. Second, the extent to which parties utilize technology as a campaign tool and the balance between the use of technology and more traditional campaign techniques.
Resource changes focus on three aspects of campaigning. Firstly, there is the degree of central party control and influence over district campaigns and, secondly, the degree to which the staffing of local campaigns has moved from a voluntary basis towards becoming more professionalised. Thirdly, this aspect also includes feedback techniques -how district-level (and national) parties monitor levels of support within the various electoral districts. Finally, the thematic category relates to two aspects of campaigning -the involvement of leading politicians in district campaigns (mainly through personal visits) and the extent to which local campaigns have evolved from being primarily concerned to mobilise specific social categories of electors towards the kind of marketing that Farrell and Webb describe, which involves targeting specific individual voters.
[Figure 1 About Here]
In what follows we illustrate the use of this framework in the British context, largely on the basis of surveys of election agents (who are responsible for running local campaigns) at each of the four general elections from 1992 to 2005, but also using qualitative information collected from party officials over the same four elections. The surveys were conducted immediately after each general election and the population covered included all agents of the three main parties in Britain (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) which are the objects of our attention here. With one exception, there were representative responses for all parties in each election (response rates are detailed in the Appendix 
Campaign Preparation
In previous work , we have shown on the basis of qualitative data how the parties at national level have increasingly planned and prepared their constituency campaigns in advance. In preparation for the 1992 election, for example, Labour set up a key seats unit some two years before polling day and such advance planning and organisation is now routine in all parties. We consider here, however, whether there is evidence of a move towards longer-term campaign preparation in the constituencies themselves. Our surveys of election agents contained a number of questions relating to campaign preparations and in order to get an overall picture, we have created two indices of long-term preparation. The single components with associated factor scores and we take these factor scores as overall measures of the extent of long-term preparation at local level. As in previous analyses (see, for example Denver and Hands 1997; Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a) , the factor scores have been standardized around a mean of 100 to allow for ease of interpretation, both between parties and over time. -though not in all (see Carty et al., 2003) . Under the simple plurality electoral system it is rational for parties to try, as far as possible, to concentrate campaign resources on target seats -those that they may gain or are in danger of losing -although there will inevitably be constraints on their ability to do this. For one thing, party membership may well be larger in seats where they have already been electorally successful (see Fisher, 2000; Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006b ). This means that not only members but the general resources that arise from larger memberships are likely to be in greater supply in seats that parties already hold. Conservatives have increased their level of long-term preparation election-on-election in target seats. This is as would be expected given the growing concentration on targets but long term-planning also appears to have increased in safe seats (held not targeted). This reflects a persistent problem for Conservative campaign managers in that their campaigns are often strongest in their safest seats, or at least nearly as strong as in their targets . Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference between targets and seats already Table 3 ).
[ Table 1 About Here]
[ Table 2 About Here]
Overall, the evidence relating to the development of long-term campaign preparation is somewhat mixed. There seems to be no trend in the overall scores but for all parties there is a fairly clear and generally increasing differentiation between different types of seats. By and large, 'hopeless' seats are falling behind in their levels of preparation compared with safe and target seats and, generally speaking, target seats are more prepared than safe ones. Thus, using this measure together with qualitative accounts of party preparations (see, for example, Denver et al., 2003 , Fisher et al., 2007 , we can say that in terms of long-term preparation the major parties have certainly moved to stage 2 in our analytical framework. [ Table 3 About Here]
Whatever the reasons for this decline in party membership, which is not unique to the United Kingdom (see Scarrow, 2002: 86-94) , it is clear that British parties will have found it increasingly difficult to mount strong traditional campaigns from the 1990s. A second contextual point, which should be made in relation to changes in campaigning during this period is that there has been a rapid growth in the availability of (and decline in the cost of) technology such as computers, which can be used in election campaigning to reduce dependence on volunteer workers. The 1992 general election was dubbed 'the fax election'
by Denver and Hands (1997) but by 2005 the fax had become all but obsolete and the use of personal computers in campaigning had become widespread.
So, the pool of labour available to work in traditional campaigns has by and large declined while a range of technologies that can be used to assist campaigns has become much more freely available. As comparative evidence shows, faced with a decline in membership parties often have little choice but to turn to more modern campaign tools in order, in part, to meet the shortfall of campaign workers (Ward, 2003; Denemark, 2003 In previous work , we have described in general terms how parties have modernised their campaigns. Ward (2003) and Denemark (2003) have illustrated similar patterns in Australia and New Zealand respectively. We analyse these changes in more detail here by using indices which measure the extent of traditionalism and modernisation in local Conservatives too had some cause for optimism -certainly much more than in the previous two elections. So while the Conservative figure may be an exaggeration, the likelihood is that there was indeed an increase in traditional activity by these two parties. A large membership does not equate fully with intense activity (Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a) but the evidence presented here suggests that the intensity of volunteer activity in campaigns is fairly closely linked with the level of membership.
[ Table 4 About Here]
In Table 5 , we show trends in campaign modernisation on the basis of the two indices described above and the overall trends are clear enough. Whichever index is used there is an election-on-election increase in the modernisation of campaigns. In both cases the overall scores for each election are significantly different from one another. There is also a steady increase for each of the parties and in each case the differences between the earlier and later elections are statistically significant. What is also noteworthy is that the increase in Labour modernisation was far slower after 1997 than it was for the other parties. Labour appears to have made great strides after 1992, but has effectively consolidated its position thereafter.
Notwithstanding our concerns about the Conservative data for 2005, it appears that increases in Conservative and Liberal Democrat modernisation have been steadier, with the Liberal Democrats rapidly 'catching-up' with the two big parties.
[ Table 5 About Here]
By and large then, traditional campaigning has been declining, whilst modernisation has been increasing. We can establish the relative balance between traditionalism and modernisation by subtracting the index of modernisation from the index of traditionalism to produce a 'net' score. Since both are measured on the same scale (having been standardised around a mean of 100), the results are easy to interpret. Positive net scores suggest more traditionalism relative to modernisation while negative scores suggest the reverse and the distance of net scores from zero allows us to establish any trends in this balance. Table 6 [ Table 6 About Here]
In Table 7 we show the net modernisation scores for each of the three main parties according to the electoral status of constituencies. It is clear, first, that the balance between traditional and modern techniques has shifted towards the latter in all types of seat. By 2005, it was only
Conservative campaigns in their safe seats, which were significantly more traditional than the other categories from 1992, that traditional activities were given more weight than modern methods. Secondly, for both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats it is in seats that were neither held nor targeted that the balance is most firmly in the direction of modern campaigning. Although in both cases scores in these hopeless seats are rarely significantly different from those in target seats, this itself is evidence that modern techniques -the use of telephones and the like -can be a sort of substitute for volunteer personnel. Where there simply aren't enough volunteers to canvass door-to-door or deliver leaflets then a few telephone canvassers can fill the gap. On the other hand, modern methods may be seen to be simply more effective and in that case we should expect to see them introduced more quickly into target seats. This is the pattern found in Labour campaigning -from 1997 campaigns in target seats are weighted more strongly in the direction of modern techniques than is the case in the other categories, a pattern confirmed by significance tests using the 1997-2005 index.
[ Table 7 About Here] Our data clearly show, then, that the use of traditional campaign techniques has been declining while modern methods have become more prevalent. Data not presented here show that for all parties the use of modern techniques is always most developed in target seats.
However, these seats also have strong traditional campaigns -volunteer workers often flood into them from the surrounding area -so that it is only in the case of the Labour party that targets show the strongest bias in favour of modernisation. For the other parties, modernisation is more clearly a response to the declining availability of campaign workers.
Modern techniques have not replaced traditional ones in British constituency campaigning, as predicted in stage 3 of the framework introduced above, but the balance has certainly shifted to the extent that what might be described as a modern approach to campaigning is now more prevalent. British parties, we suggest therefore, are now somewhere between stages 2 and 3 in the typology of changes in campaigning.
Resource

Centralisation
There is much qualitative evidence indicating that during the 1990s and after constituency campaigns in Britain came increasingly to be directed and managed by professionals at central party headquarters Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a) . Similar trends have also been observed in Australia and New Zealand (Ward, 2003; Denemark, 2003) . What has emerged is a new and much stronger relationship between the national and local campaigns. National party professionals now seek to exercise much greater influence and control over local campaigning by managing key constituency campaigns in crucial respects and integrating them much more closely into the national effort. Local campaign strategies are developed centrally and in tandem with the parties' overall national campaign strategies. The centre appoints special campaign organisers in key seats (or provides centrally-paid agents in the case of the Conservatives) and is involved in local campaigns in a variety of other ways -by organising direct mail operations and telephone canvassing from outside the constituency; for example. These changes began first, and have gone furthest, in the Labour party but both the Conservatives and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats have followed Labour's lead. As has been argued elsewhere, in many respects the initiative in local campaigning in target seats has passed from the local party to the parties' national headquarters (Denver et al. 1998 ). Democrats, it had not gone as far as in the other parties, partly due to a simple lack of resources but also in line with the party's decentralising ethos. This analysis also found that central involvement was heavily targeted -the central involvement index scores were significantly higher in target seats than in the other categories. Not unexpectedly, central coordinating efforts were strongly focused on the campaigns that were most electorally significant.
In this section, we update the previous discussions of increasing central involvement in constituency campaigns by adding material from the 2005 general election. The parties' strategies in that election certainly suggest a further development of centralising trends, especially on the part of the Conservatives and Labour (Fisher et al., 2007) . Both sought to present their national message within a local context. To that end, in campaign material circulated within a constituency policies were frequently not described in a national context but presented as proposals which would have a particular impact in the constituency concerned. This was achieved principally though the extensive use of direct communication techniques by both Labour and the Conservatives to contact key voters in key seats. Both parties had large communication centres from which key voters were sent direct mail and contacted by telephone. In effect, national headquarters were playing an ever-greater role in communicating the messages of the constituency campaigns. In a particular innovation, many voters were telephoned not by an individual in a call centre, but by an automated phone system, allowing parties to collect vote intention data (or 'Voter ID') and other relevant information more quickly and more cheaply than before. Arguably, by 2005 the 'ground war' in the constituencies had come to be seen as more important than the 'air war' waged at national level. Fisher (2005) shows that the 'national' campaigns of all three major parties were strongly focused on target seats and that regional media advertising was as important, if not more so than that undertaken at national level. This is further confirmation of the importance that the parties now attach to local campaigning but, significantly, it is nationallyco-ordinated constituency campaigning that is dominant rather than locally organisedcampaigning.
We illustrate these trends, using quantitative measures, in Table 8 centrally-controlled activities such as direct mail and telephone canvassing, campaigns in these seats also remain relatively strong in terms of 'foot slogging' activities on the ground, which are inherently decentralised.
[ Table 8 About Here]
Staffing
Overwhelmingly, the work related to constituency campaigning is carried out by volunteers.
However, the modernisation and centralisation of campaigns have involved an increase in the numbers of paid staff with responsibilities related to the local effort -mainly staff at the parties' national headquarters and in national call centres. Indeed, Webb and Fisher (2003:10) have noted that there have been substantial increases in the proportion of all kinds of paid staff relative to members in both the Conservative and Labour parties. Even 'on the ground', however, there have also been significant changes with paid staff playing an increasingly significant role in some constituency campaigns. During the 1990s, as we have seen, the parties began to re-assess the importance of constituency campaigning and as a result central party staff began to take constituency campaigning much more seriously. Party managers realised that there was an important job to be done in the constituencies but they also increasingly came (or were forced) to the view that employing full-time agents locally or relying entirely on voluntary agents was not necessarily the best way to do it -even although the law still requires the appointment of a local agent.
One response from the parties was to try to 'professionalise' the volunteers -providing programmes of training to develop the organisational skills and abilities that can profitably be brought to bear at constituency level. Labour, for example, introduced a professional training programme for campaign organisers in 1999, which involved a formal award upon completion (Webb and Fisher, 2003: 18) . In addition, however, all three parties have looked for other ways to ensure that professional expertise is available to key constituency campaigns. For example, since 1997 the Conservatives have employed and part-financed local agents from the centre. In addition, following the 1997 election, the party abolished its regional tier of organisation and moved to a system in which Area Campaign Directors had responsibility for a number of constituencies. Labour began to appoint special organisers in 1992 -people centrally recruited, trained and appointed on short-term contracts -to particular target constituencies (or groups of constituencies) to oversee election preparations and then to organise the campaign itself. The Liberal Democrats have not had the resources to undertake programmes on this scale but, even so, by 2001 party headquarters provided financial assistance to allow paid agents or part-time organisers to be employed in key seats and two Assistant Campaign Directors were appointed at national level to assist and encourage the development of effective constituency campaign organisations (Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006c ).
In sum, it would seem that in this respect parties have moved to Stage 2 of our framework and are displaying some characteristics of Stage 3. Parties have professionalized their staff (both paid and volunteer) at both national and local levels (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006c (Gerber & Green, 2000 , 2001 Pattie & Johnston, 2003) but there is no doubt that these methods are on the increase. [ Table 9 About Here]
In Table 10 , we examine the extent to which more modern feedback methods have been employed, such as telephone canvassing and direct mail. The index used here was created in the same way as others previously described and details of variables used are in the Appendix. Given the emphasis on telephone canvassing, data for this index are available only from 1997 onwards. As expected, modern and perhaps more 'scientific' forms of voter feedback have come increasingly to the fore. In all parties, there has been a clear and statistically significant growth in modern feedback techniques since 1997 -especially in The DVD also contained a feedback mechanism, which enabled the party to ascertain how much of the DVD was viewed and evidently many key voters watched it in its entirety (Fisher et al., 2005: 19) .
In the same election, the Conservatives increased their use of polling and focus group data.
Daily tracking polls were undertaken among key voters in target seats, focussing on salient issues, candidate recognition and assessments of the party leaders. Focus group research was also employed to check on how campaign messages were being received and the party used the results to 'tweak messages' on particular issues (such as crime and immigration) in an attempt to attract undecided voters (Fisher et al., 2005: 20) . Moreover, in all parties, the central monitoring of local campaigns has increased significantly, so that even individual constituency campaigns can be 'tweaked' in response to local concerns. All of this suggests that, in terms of feedback, British parties are well on the way to Stage 3 of our typology, if not already there.
[ Table 10 About Here]
Thematic
Tours by Party Leaders and Key Party Figures
Tours by key party figures have long been a highly visible component of constituency party campaigning. Gladstone was the first major politician to 'stump the country' in the nineteenth century, delivering speeches directed at the whole country (and reported in the press) but with a local twist designed to make the speeches more relevant to his audience (Hanham, 1978: 202-4) . In the 1950 election, Clement Attlee (the Prime minister) undertook a 1,000 mile tour around Britain being driven in a pre-war (and far from deluxe) family saloon by his wife (Nicholas, 1951: 93-4 ).
Attlee's tour, during which he reportedly visited seven towns a day, was focussed on Labour's key electoral regions (Nicholas, 1951:90) . At the same election, Winston Churchill also spoke in a number of constituencies -amongst them, Plymouth Devonport, chosen apparently because of the highly newsworthy contest there between Randolph Churchill and Michael Foot (Nicholas, 1951: 94) . This mirrors in some ways the 1966 campaign, in which
Conservative leadership visits to marginals tended to be a function of personal contacts, rather than a centrally co-ordinated effort by the party (Butler and King, 1966: 194) . Indeed, Denver and Hands (1997:111) noted that as late as 1992 personal favours could still explain some constituency visits by the party hierarchy.
However, as Butler and Kavanagh (1974: 224) suggest, from 1974 there was a far greater emphasis on focussing leadership tours on marginal seats, rather than on regions or newsworthy contests. In advance of the February 1974 election, both major parties had drawn up short lists of key marginals in advance and during the campaign itself, all parties tried to direct their prominent national speakers to these seats (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974: 224-6 ).
That said, some local parties did not entirely support this strategy, claiming that the visits were too disruptive -a problem that Denver and Hands (1997: 112) also reported in the 1992 election. Nonetheless, from February 1974 onwards, it was clear that party leadership tours were planned around marginal seats to a far greater degree than previously. Butler and Kavanagh (1975: 226) say that, in the October election of the same year, Conservative marginal seats were given 'a special claim on front bench speakers', and by 1979 the practice was well established (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980: 308) . Clearly, then, by 1979 party leadership tours had moved from stage 1 to stage 2 of the campaigning development framework -from nationwide whistle-stop tours to a focus on target seats.
Our surveys of party agents allow us to test the extent to which these practices have evolved since 1992 and relevant data are shown in Table 11 . No question was asked on this aspect of campaigning in 2001, and while it was restored in 2005, the question about leadership visits asked only whether they had occurred, rather than about the frequency of visits as in 1992 and 1997. Nevertheless, the data do provide some indication of change over time.
As anticipated, in all parties senior figures are far more likely to visit target seats than other constituencies. In the cases of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the concentration on target seats appears to have become more marked, with declines in visits to seats that were neither targeted nor held. The differences between target and non-target seats for Labour are particularly marked -especially in 1997 when every target seat among our responding constituencies received a visit and the mean number of visits was an astonishing 6.7. In 2005, there was something of an increase in visits to safer Labour-held seats. This can probably be explained by the fact that Labour was on the defensive not only from its opponents, but also from disillusioned Labour supporters. Appearances by party 'names' in safe seats were probably organised, therefore, to 'rally the troops'.
The data for the Conservatives are a little more puzzling. It is true that in all three elections senior party figures were far more likely to visit target seats and in 1992 and 1997, visited almost all of them. The dip in the proportion of target seats visited in 2005 is almost certainly a function of the lower response rate from Conservative agents in that year. However, in all three elections, it is notable that 'hopeless' seats were relatively well treated in terms of leadership visits -more so than safe seats. Given that, as already mentioned, an underlying problem with Conservative campaigns has been that they tend to mount needlessly strong campaigns in their safest seats, this is a particularly peculiar result. It may be a consequence of the fact that in 2005 the Conservatives needed to be on the offensive -to make serious efforts even in seats that were not among their best prospects -although it may also suggest that Labour and the Liberal Democrats are simply better than the Conservatives at targeting leadership visits. Whatever the reason, it suggests that the extent to which parties are moving between Stage 2 and 3 of the typology varies somewhat -certainly Labour would appear to be ahead of the Conservatives in this respect.
[ Table 11 About Here]
Targeting of Voters
One of the consequences of class and partisan dealignment is that parties are no longer able to rely on core groups of voters for almost automatic support. Thus, of necessity, parties are likely to move on from Stage 1 of our typology although, as evidence from New Zealand illustrates, different countries can experience dealignment at completely different times (Denemark, 2003: 603) . In the British case, dealignment has been progressing for at least thirty years so it is little surprise that parties no longer focus their campaigning activities on maintaining support among specific social categories. The question is whether in this respect local campaigning is best characterised as being at Stage 2 (mobilizing voters across all categories) or Stage 3 (targeting specific groups of voters). Table 12 Liberal Democrats on pensioners and students .
Nevertheless, the data in Table 12 [ Table 12 About Here]
However, the effort undertaken at local level provides only a partial picture of attempts to influence specific groups of voters within constituencies. As we have seen, the parties'
headquarters have become increasingly important in constituency campaigns and have contributed directly via telephone canvassing and direct mail, over and above purely local activities. Interviews with party professionals suggest that in terms of these nationallydirected efforts the parties have certainly moved strongly to targeting specific categories of voters. Labour was first to move significantly in this direction in preparation for the 1997 election. Telephone banks were established some 18 months before the election and party workers across the country used them to contact voters in key seats. Using a centrallydesigned script-cum-questionnaire, callers allocated voters to one of a number of categories and this information was then used to identify target groups of voters, comprising about 15
per cent of the electorate in the relevant constituencies. Subsequently, these voters were re-contacted by telephone, sent appropriate direct mail communications at regular intervals and visited in person by local campaign workers (Denver et al., 2003: 543) . In the 2001 and 2005 elections these techniques were further refined. In 2001, the party began to make use of demographic data relating to neighbourhoods, combining them with a database of voter identification, which enabled not only further refinement of the target groups to be contacted from the centre, but also provided the basis for guidelines issued to constituencies detailing which groups and areas should receive special attention (Denver et al., 2003: 544) . In 2005, the process was taken even further, with young people, women and families, and Muslims receiving particular attention (Fisher et al., 2005: 13) .
The Conservatives have also employed this sort of approach and although they were initially not as advanced as Labour, by 2005 they had effectively caught-up and were enthusiastically prosecuting a strategy of targeting key groups in target seats -in particular pensioners and ethnic minorities (Fisher et al., 2005: 12) . The Liberal Democrats, in contrast, have made far less use of the kinds of technology employed by Labour and the Conservatives. This was principally a function of cost -the party is notably less wealthy than the other two and such methods require investment at least two years before an election. Thus, although the Liberal Democrats were better funded than ever before for the 2005 campaign, financial support arrived too late to be invested in such technology (Fisher, 2005: 184) . Nevertheless, there is still evidence that by 2005, the party had also reached Stage 3 in terms of targeting voters. At that election the party tried in particular to engage and mobilise students by targeting university campuses (with the assistance of Liberal Democrat student societies), and by targeting mail specifically at students (Fisher et al., 2005:14) .
Conclusions
Studies of district-level campaigning have clearly demonstrated that local efforts can have a significant electoral effect and that concentrating on national campaigns -characteristic of much of the literature on campaigning -gives an incomplete picture of elections. Typologies describing the development of national campaigns are relatively common and are, of course, important in their own way. It also remains the case that national and local strategies are closely intertwined but we suggest that a distinct framework applying to district-level campaigning is needed to analyse changes in local campaigning in a comparative contexteven if it is informed by previous work on national campaigning. The use of the framework introduced here allows for an examination of many aspects of campaigning that are specifically pertinent to the district level which will often not be captured by national level studies. Moreover, the disaggregation of campaign styles shows how levels of income do not have uniform effects on parties' ability to campaign. During the period studied here, for example, Labour has typically been the wealthiest party at national level (Fisher, 2005 ). Yet, the Conservatives have still been able to mount strong campaigns. More telling is the case of the Liberal Democrats who are markedly less wealthy than either Labour or the
Conservatives. Yet, that party has been able to mount successful campaigns though strategic use of resources. In sum, therefore, the framework introduced here represents an attempt to better classify the distinct and important developments that have occurred in district-level campaigning.
Applying the framework to the British case shows quite clearly that there are variations in campaign development across the different parties and also according to the particular aspect of campaigning being considered. Moreover, there is further variation depending upon the electoral status of the constituency. Applying it in other systems should help researchers to make systematic cross-national comparisons. Developments in constituency campaigning in Britain are summarized in Table 13 which suggests that, across the various stages of development, Labour is the most 'modern' in its approach to campaigning, just pipping the Conservatives in respect of staffing and the use of leading party figures. The Conservatives, in turn, are just ahead of the Liberal Democrats, although the differences are not great. In our previous work, reliant on qualitative evidence, we suggested that while Labour had taken the lead in developing constituency campaigning, the other major parties were 'catching-up' . This suggestion is borne out by the various analyses presented here. It might be expected that the Conservatives would catch up -the major parties keep an eye on one another's activities and are happy to copy good ideas -but it is interesting to find that the Liberal Democrats too have made significant advances, given their relative lack of resources, especially finance. In fact, the summary data in Table 13 , together with the details previously discussed suggest that all three major British parties have adapted well to the changed electoral, organisational and technical circumstances, though it may be the case that Labour's progress has 'stalled' a little. Nevertheless, all three have modernised their constituency campaigns and doubtless will continue to do so as new circumstances arise and new ideas emerge about how to achieve the fundamental task for all parties -getting people to vote for them.
Yet these trends also have significant implications. In all parties there is a move away from traditional grass-roots activism and towards more modern and centrally directed campaigning. This is a clear example of a more general move from mass membership-based parties to 'electoral-professional' parties. There are also wider implications. First, the evident targeting strategy of parties is likely to amplify the differential levels of electoral turnout between marginal and non-marginal seats. If that occurs, the effect will be likely to be a depression in aggregate levels of turnout, together with disenchantment of voters in seats not targeted by parties. Of course, the parties cannot be blamed for this -it is an entirely rational response to the logic of a first past the post electoral system. Secondly, the targeting strategy in combination with greater centralisation and modern campaign methods may put pressure on the regulatory framework. In Britain, national and district level campaigning are regarded as being separate for regulatory purposes. How far that distinction can remain meaningful, however, is a moot point. On a more positive note, however, the strategies employed by parties such as voter differentiation, feedback and local focus as demonstrated here may actually illustrate a greater willingness on the part of parties to note and act upon voters'
concerns. Thus, the stages of development in district-level campaigning should be seen as just that, with implications that be both positive and negative.
[ Table 13 About Here] 
